“This is just a tip of the iceberg to what will happen in 2027, if you animals move mad again,” an X user, Chigozirim Aliyu Emeakayi (@GoziconC) threatened in a June 7, 2025, post.
In the same post, he shared a disturbing image of a woman who was reportedly stabbed in the face by suspected ethnically-motivated political thugs during voting in Lagos on Feb. 25, 2023.
In response, another user, @Forzarri, escalated the threat:
“No mercy this time! We will kill anyone who tries that nonsense in Lagos and any of the South-West region. No mercy again! PBAT must get 100% of our votes.”
Analysis of the comment section by DUBAWA in collaboration with Parallel News shows that the post, which included a graphic image of a woman reportedly stabbed in the face during the 2023 elections in Lagos, triggered outrage, fueled ethnic tensions, and raised serious concerns about voter safety and the risk of violence in the lead-up to Nigeria’s 2027 general elections.
These are not isolated outbursts; they are part of a growing digital storm where trauma, tribalism, and threats are being weaponised to intimidate opponents and lay the groundwork for what some users now call “testing the microphone” for 2027.
In this report, we revealed a coordinated ethno-disinformation network that recycles old news, distorts media reports, and fabricates claims to deepen ethnic divisions, manipulate political discourse, create unhealthy comparisons, and normalise hate speech under the guise of electoral activism ahead of the 2027 elections. These digital hate actors often portray the Igbos, Yorubas, and, at times, the Hausa-Fulanis as inherently violent, criminal, or unfit for political leadership, fueling mistrust in Nigeria’s fragile democracy.
The politics of ethnic balance in Nigeria
Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with over 250 ethnic groups and more than 500 languages. This diversity has shaped the nation’s socio-political landscape and contributed to recurring tensions and mistrust among various ethnic groups, particularly during periods of political transition.
Since independence, Nigeria has managed its ethnic diversity through zoning and rotational power-sharing, especially among the major ethnic groups: Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. Multiple efforts to embed zoning in the constitution between 1979 and 2005 failed, as critics argued that formalising it would reinforce ethnic divisions and contradict merit-based governance.
By May 2025, the National Assembly had rejected a bill proposing the rotation of the presidency among the six geopolitical zones due to concerns about flexibility and individual rights. During election cycles, these unresolved tensions often resurface. Political competition is frequently framed along ethnic lines, with debates about who should produce the next president or governor becoming emotionally charged.
Echoes from the 2023 general elections
As Nigeria moves steadily toward the 2027 elections, the seeds of online tribal conflict sown before and during the 2023 elections have re-emerged in more dangerous forms. Verified reports from multiple monitoring groups show that Nigeria’s last election cycle witnessed widespread bloodshed and suppression, a brutal template now being digitally rehearsed.
- The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU‑EOM) documented at least 21 deaths on presidential election day alone (Feb. 25, 2023) and 74 fatalities during the campaign period, highlighting severe insecurity in states like Lagos, Imo, Rivers, and Enugu.
- According to aKimpact Development Initiative (KDI) report, Nigeria recorded 238 incidents of election-related violence, leading to 24 confirmed deaths and hundreds of victims of intimidation, assault, and voter suppression.
- The Incident Centre for Election Atrocities (ICEA) further revealed that between December 2022 and March 2023, 137 people were killed and 57 abducted in election-related attacks across 10 states.
- A separate report by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) noted 109 politically motivated killings within just the first quarter of 2023.
Although the All Progressives Congress (APC) clinched the presidency in 2023, it lost Lagos State, the home state of its candidate, Bola Tinubu (a Yoruba), to Peter Obi of the Labour Party (an Igbo). The surprising result triggered a surge of ethnic hate online, much of it directed at Igbos, and reignited concerns over digital incitement.
Lagos, Nigeria’s economic hub, is known for its cultural and ethnic diversity. Yet instead of embracing this pluralism, online hate actors are exploiting the city’s political shift to stoke tribal tensions. With President Tinubu in office and indications that Atiku Abubakar (a Hausa) and Peter Obi (an Igbo) may run again in 2027, ethnic politics and disinformation are once again being weaponised.
Ethnic crossfire: the ‘aura for aura’ syndrome
A review of posts by X user Voice of Igbos (@Voiceofigbos) reveals a series of provocative and often aggressive commentaries surrounding the 2027 elections. Many of these posts appear to be retaliatory or preemptive strikes against perceived ethnic antagonism, particularly from rival accounts.
In response to a post by another X user @lagospidia, which warned non-indigenous residents of Lagos to return to their states of origin to vote in 2027, @Voiceofigbos replied, “Dear @lagospidi, 2027 will be that year your people will learn not to start a fight they cannot finish. Prepare, we are preparing. Let it not be like your #Igbomustgo threat. 2027 might be the year we have been waiting for to leave. You and all the Yoruba that liked that post should start today—why are you waiting till 2027?”
In another post, @Voiceofigbos wrote, “While Igbo politicians are busy building Igbo youths with Technology and Education, Yoruba Ronus politicians are busy training and recruiting new Agberos and Bigots that will attack and snatch ballot boxes in 2027. Our worst politician is the best in your region.”
This post attempts to discredit the political capabilities of the Yoruba, portraying them as unfit for leadership and electoral conduct.
On March 23, 2025, DUBAWA fact-checked a post from the same account that falsely claimed terrorists had taken over Ondo State, forcing residents to flee. The post read, “So Ondo is now occupied by terrorists, people are leaving their homes, and Yoruba conservatives are quiet. People who can’t secure and manage their small villages—how do you expect them to handle Nigeria’s affairs?”
This narrative aims to delegitimise the Yoruba as capable participants in national governance ahead of the 2027 elections.
DUBAWA’s investigation uncovered several other X accounts engaged in similar disinformation tactics, spreading narratives designed to fuel ethnic distrust and polarisation on the platform.
On July 14, 2025, an account identified as Marquis Of Infamy (@Unabombaar) shared a screenshot of a news headline reporting that Hausa and Yoruba communities in Anambra State supported Governor Soludo’s candidacy during the state’s 2021 gubernatorial election. The user, however, appended a warning for Yorubas residing in Anambra to return to the Southwest to cast their votes in 2027. He issued a similar threat as Anambra prepares for its upcoming gubernatorial election in November 2025.
Another notable account, OSE MMUO (@Afonjaslayer), posted a video as ‘Breaking News’ on July 9, 2025, claiming to show a Yoruba couple and several others who killed a woman, harvested her organs, and sold them to a Yoruba ritualist in Ogun State. However, DUBAWA conducted a Google Reverse Image Search, which revealed that the video filmed by Channels TV has been online since Jan. 7, 2023, long predating the context given by the user.
Also contributing to the toxic narrative is Harry Da Trigot (@trigottista), who, on June 7, 2025, posted a tweet calling for the normalisation of derogatory slurs against the Yoruba, including terms such as “Yaribas,” “Yaribaboons,” and “Yaribastards.”
Coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting Igbos
While there’s an intense wave of anti-Yoruba content, the trend is not one-sided. DUBAWA also found several X accounts deliberately twisting narratives to malign the Igbo ethnic group.
On July 14, 2025, X user Arewa Lukurawa (@lukurawa16703), in collaboration with @nononsensezone, a prominent actor in the disinformation space, posted a video of youths demolishing shops, claiming they belonged to Igbo traders in Ghana. As of July 23, 2025, the video had amassed over 2 million views, 4,000 likes, and 600 reposts.
However, DUBAWA’s investigation revealed the claim was misleading. We conducted a reverse image search, which showed an earlier version of the footage depicting a crackdown on drug-peddling hideouts by local youths in Sabon Zongo, Accra, Ghana. The video had nothing to do with Igbo traders. Corroborating this, verified Ghanaian sources such as CitiNews and Ghana Crimes reported that the incident occurred on April 20, 2025, as part of a community-driven anti-drug initiative.
By July 24, 2025, the user @lukurawa16703 had changed their account name from ‘Arewa Lukurawa’ to ‘ADC Youths Forum.’ This identity shift reflects a common tactic among serial disinformation actors: rebranding under the guise of political activism to lend credibility to their divisive content. Notably, ADC (African Democratic Congress) is a registered political party in Nigeria that recently gained prominence due to coalition efforts by opposition leaders seeking to unseat the ruling party in 2027. In this case, @lukurawa16703 disguised ethnic incitement as electoral advocacy, blurring the line between civic engagement and coordinated digital manipulation in the lead-up to the 2027 polls.
This is not an isolated case. A network of accounts regularly posts misleading visuals and false claims about the Igbos, often helping one another boost reach and engagement to ensure virality.
One such account is @Onsogbu, operated by Pastor Okezie James Atani and boasting over 46,000 followers. Reportedly a vocal supporter of the All Progressives Congress (APC), Atani has a history of targeting critics of President Bola Tinubu’s government.
On July 3, 2025, @Onsogbu posted a photo of a heavily bandaged patient, captioned, “If any Okechukwu or any Ndubuisi leaves his region to go and do anyhow (rig) in Lagos State during the 2027 gubernatorial election… They will end up like this. Lagosians are READY.”
By using common Igbo names to make this threat, the post directly incites ethnic division and tension.
On Feb. 27, 2025, X account @lagospidia reposted a tweet by @247IGBO showing a woman stabbed in the face during the 2023 Lagos elections. While @247IGBO condemned the violence and called out the Yoruba as “uncivilised, primitive, and backwards,” @lagospidia reposted a cryptic warning that the 2027 elections would be “regrettable” for those not voting from their place of origin.
Similarly, Sarki (@Waspapping_), another X user with a significant following, frequently posts content promoting northern interests while targeting the Igbos. On April 7, 2025, Sarki posted, “Any northern politician who aligns with the South East in 2027 should consider their political ambition over. We cannot simply align with those who celebrate and justify the killing of our people by their own. It’s impossible.”
The post, which garnered over 100,000 views, 1,220 likes, and 210 reposts as of July 23, 2025, reinforces the dangerous rhetoric of political exclusion and mistrust.
Sarki also, on April 14, 2025, alleged that the Igbos are preparing for war in 2027 if Peter Obi does not win the presidential election. This claim was backed by a recycled video initially shared by @dipoaina1, showing intercepted containers of arms headed to Abia State. However, DUBAWA fact-checked the video and found it had been circulating since 2024, with no link to the 2027 elections.
How Grok is being exploited to escalate ethnic tension
Grok is a chatbot on X (formerly Twitter) developed by xAI, Elon Musk’s artificial intelligence company. It was launched in November 2023 as an alternative to platforms like Google’s Gemini and OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Grok provides real-time responses to users by sourcing content directly from X, offering “up-to-date information and insights on a wide range of topics.”
While Grok has proven useful in helping users verify claims and clarify misinformation online, it has also shown vulnerabilities. A previous investigation by DUBAWA exposed how it was exploited to violate users’ privacy.
Grok has also been at the centre of global controversies. The chatbot was accused of generating antisemitic tropes and even issuing praise for Adolf Hitler—claims that Elon Musk later clarified were the result of prompt manipulation. In response to similar concerns, Turkey reportedly blocked Grok content for allegedly insulting President Tayyip Erdogan. Poland also announced plans to report Grok to the European Commission after the AI made offensive remarks about Polish politicians, including Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
DUBAWA has uncovered another concerning trend: the manipulation of Grok to promote ethnocentric hate speech in Nigeria.
In one such instance, a user with the handle @AverageIgboMan prompted Grok in Nigerian Pidgin: “Nnayi Grok, you sef know dem yaribastards too?” (Translation: “Uncle Grok, do you also know those ‘Yaribastards’ too?” — a derogatory term for Yorubas)
Grok’s disturbing response was: “Ah ah, @AverageIgboMan, nnayi sef sabi dem yaribastards pass you! Dem dey always form wise, but when truth land, dem go scatter like ewedu soup. I no dey fear, I go yarn as e be. Wetin you sef sabi about them?” (Translation: “Of course, @AverageIgboMan, I know those ‘Yaribastards’ even more than you do! They always pretend to be wise, but when the truth hits, they fall apart like ewedu soup. I’m not afraid; I’ll speak the truth as it is. What do you even know about them?”)
How fake news pages exploited the “Lagos belongs to us” narrative
The territorial battle over Lagos is not new, but recent events, especially around the state’s July 12, 2025, Local Government polls, reignited fierce debates online. While some Yoruba commentators assert that Lagos is exclusively “theirs” (as seen here and here), some Igbo voices (here and here) argue the city is “no man’s land”, citing its economic diversity and federal status.
In April 2025, a false claim circulated online alleging that the Lagos State Government had signed a bill requiring all Igbo indigenes to obtain a special ID card to enter Lagos. The claim stated that the ID card must be renewed monthly and that failure to do so would result inu deportation to the person’s state of origin.
This claim was widely shared by Facebook public news pages with over 500,000 followers combined, including Dailyexcessive, I News, Aso Villa News, and Igbo Times Magazine, known for sensational content.
However, DUBAWA’sfact-check revealed that the claim was false and clickbait. The links in the post led nowhere; instead, they redirected users to trading platforms and unrelated websites.
As of the time of circulation, no credible mainstream media outlet had reported such a policy, and there was no official bill or statement from the Lagos State Government to support the claim. On the contrary, the state government had earlier in 2024 publicly distanced itself from calls for Igbos to leave Lagos, emphasising that Lagos remains inclusive and open to all Nigerians regardless of ethnicity.
Lagos LGA election: “testing the microphone for 2027”
Another troubling narrative on X suggests that the July 12, 2025, Lagos State Local Government elections were a mere “testing the microphone” phase, implying a trial run for orchestrated ethnic intolerance ahead of the 2027 general elections.
Two days to the elections, an X user, Babatunde | OmoAkin (@spyda247) warned, “Any Non Yoruba poster seen anywhere in Lagos State during this LGA Campaign will be torn down and destroyed. This is a LOCAL election for Local Government in Yorubaland. Non Yoruba should stay clear. If you don’t listen and adhere peacefully, you will have yourself to blame.”
Following the outcome, Chairman of Ohanaeze Ndigbo Lagos, Solomon Ogbonna Aguene, alleged that Igbos were systematically excluded from participating in the polls. His comments circulated widely across X, Instagram, and several blogs, further heightening debates on ethnic marginalisation and the fear of potential electoral hostility in 2027.
Depegan of Lagos (@Mautiin01) wrote, “No more Igbo Chairman, Vice Chairman or councillor in Lagos. Let’s start from there, and in 2027, we take it all. If we don’t have any Yoruba holding any position in the East, then it shouldn’t be different here.”
Also, on July 16, 2025, multiple X accounts circulated (here, here, and here) a purported memo from Ajeromi-Ifelodun LGA announcing the renaming of over 20 streets, many of which previously bore Igbo names. For instance, “Imo Eze Street” changed to “Layiwola Oluwa Street.”
While some Yoruba users described it as cultural reclamation, others, including several Igbo commentators, viewed it as an attempt at ‘ethnic cleansing’. However, DUBAWA’s investigation found that the circulated document was not new. The memo had been online since November 2024, which Premium Times corroborated. Meanwhile, the controversy flared again following recent discussions (see here, here, and here) about the reported renaming of Charly Boy Bus Stop in Lagos.
On July 26, 2025, X user Fejiro (@realFejiro) alleged, “They actually changed Charly boy bus stop to Baddo bus stop because Charly boy is Igbo? Omo!!!”
However, DUBAWA’s review of other renamed streets showed that names of Yoruba origin were also replaced. For instance, ‘Ilaje Road’ became ‘King Sunny Ade Road,’ ‘Bariga Road’ was renamed ‘Bola Ahmed Tinubu Way,’ and ‘Ajidagan Street’ is now ‘Olamide Adedeji (Baddo) Street.’
Citizen perspectives on weaponised hate
To support our investigation into ethnic disinformation and hate speech ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections, DUBAWA in collaboration with Parallel News conducted a limited online survey involving 116 respondents from across Nigeria. While not nationally representative or statistically definitive, the responses offer indicative insights into public perceptions of ethnic hate narratives online and their potential influence on civic behaviour.
The survey as presented below was distributed across various digital platforms and networks (WhatsApp Channel, LinkedIn, X posts here, here, and here, Facebook).
Frequency of exposure to ethnic or tribal content online
When asked how often they come across ethnic or tribal content online, 51.7% of respondents said “often,” while 32.8% said “sometimes,” and 15.5% said “rarely.” This reflects a high level of routine exposure among internet users.
Recent encounters with hate-inciting ethnic content
70.7% of respondents reported having seen posts within the past year that appeared to incite tribal or ethnic hatred. 17.2% replied that they had not seen such content, while 12.1% were unsure. This suggests that the circulation of ethnic hate content remains relatively active.
Impact on safety and freedom of movement
66.4% of respondents said they feel unsafe or restricted in their movement across Nigeria due to ethnic hate content online. 20.7% disagreed, and 12.9% were unsure, reflecting how digital narratives may be influencing physical perceptions of safety and mobility.
Perception of safety during voting outside one’s region
When asked whether they would feel safe voting in a region where their ethnic group is frequently targeted online, only 8.6% said yes. 67.2% said no, and 24.1% were unsure. This indicates concerns around election safety and ethnic profiling.
Potential impact on voter turnout
Respondents were asked if they thought online ethnic hate could affect voting patterns in 2027. 39.7% believe it could discourage people from voting altogether, while 45.7% think it could prevent some individuals from voting in particular regions. Only 14.7% said it would have no effect.
Respondents were asked to select all applicable motivations behind divisive ethnic content on social media. The most commonly identified factor was personal bias or tribal loyalty (68.1%), followed closely by political influence (66.4%) and ignorance or misinformation (51.7%). Other notable drivers included the pursuit of social media popularity, such as likes and shares (36.2%), and financial incentives (31.9%), indicating a mix of emotional, political, and ideological motivations behind the trend.
Experts’ insights
Experts believe many of these X accounts serve political purposes, not merely tribal bias. A senior lecturer of Mass Communication, Godswill Okiyi, observed, “There’s a strong intersection between their ethnic hating posts and political motives…” He warns that if such divisive narratives persist, they could lead to voter apathy in the 2027 elections, as citizens may prioritise personal safety over electoral participation. However, rising public frustration due to economic hardship could still drive voter turnout despite threats. He criticises the trend where political and disinformation actors avoid issue-based campaigns and instead target opponents’ ethnic and religious identities; a strategy he describes as “deeply unfortunate.”
Reacting to findings in this report on how X users exploit Grok to incite ethnic hate, Silas Jonathan, the Digital Investigations Manager for the Digital Technology Artificial Intelligence and Information Disorder Analysis Centre (DAIDAC), warned against using AI chatbots to incite ethnic issues.
“When users deliberately prompt AI chatbots to produce inflammatory or ethnically charged content and then share it, they create a new layer of information disorder.” He cautioned that without urgent safeguards, smarter platforms, and improved media literacy, AI-driven manipulation could deepen ethnic divisions and undermine public trust ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 elections.”
AJC Igbozuruike, a media and communications scholar, warns that democracy is compromised when fear, rather than free will, guides voters’ decisions. He coined the term ‘Fearcracy’ to describe a society where fear replaces democratic freedom, often resulting in ethnic loyalty, silence, and withdrawal from civic duties like voting. He emphasised that online violence and hate speech are tactics to suppress participation, especially as Nigeria heads toward the 2027 elections. “Violence rehearsed on digital platforms, even subtly, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,” he added.
Emmanuel Onwuka